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ABSTRACT
When the Baltic States regained their independence in 1991, Denmark had been one of their very 
strongest supporters, at a time when many European countries looked at the Baltic aspirations with 
caution. It was one of the first examples of the new post-Cold War “activist” Danish foreign policy 
strategy. It was not, however, without difficulties. Thus, the article argues that the Danish Social 
Democratic centre-left and Conservative-Liberal centre-right disagreed on how to support the Balts 
in practice and at what price. The difference was rooted in a hawk-dove disagreement over détente 
and the Soviet Union. Government party colour, the article argues, is therefore likely to have been 
crucial for the Danish policy. Had the relatively hawkish centre-right government not been in po-
wer, it is very doubtful that we would have seen the kind of aggressive diplomatic support for Baltic 
independence as we saw from Denmark leading up to 1991. 
When the Baltic countries fought their way to independence in 1991, three factors in particular 
made it possible: the implosion of the Soviet Union, US support for the Baltic cause (pressuring 
the Soviet Union to abstain from massive bloodshed) and, most of all, an energetic local 
drive for independence in each of the Baltic countries. However, small countries, especially 
Denmark and Iceland, also played an important role (Readman, 2006, p. 32), by providing a 
different array of diplomatic assistance and support. Not so much because Denmark or Iceland 
mattered particularly much in international politics, but because they mobilized others to 
follow1. This was especially important, when American attention was distracted by events 
in other parts of the globe, as was the case, for example, during the First Gulf War.  As such, 
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1 It is not the purpose of this article to attempt to determine which of these two countries delivered the 
most important help to the Balts. The help delivered by Denmark and Iceland was, in any event, quite different. 
For both countries there was, from early on, a link to the US, which was keen on utilizing both Nordic countries 
to indirectly promote a policy that it itself felt unable to do because of the precarious nature of the US-Soviet 
relationship. This led the US, on occasion, to directly ask both Iceland and Denmark to criticize the Soviet Union 
on its behalf (For Iceland, see (Readman, 2006: p. 18), for Denmark, see (Udenrigsministeriet ((Danish Ministry 
for Foreign Affairs (MFA)), March 24 1990). However, especially in the relationship with the US, the two diverged. 
Denmark embraced this cooperation with the US, characterized by being moderately ahead of the US, because 
the Danes, perceived this strategy as the most efficient way to try to keep the US interested in the Baltic coun-
tries (Olesen, 2013: pp. 354-55 & 362-65). Iceland, on the other hand, might have chosen to go beyond that 
role, especially with the early Icelandic recognition of Lithuania’s independence (de jure) in February 1991. This 
was at least what an US official told the Danish embassy in Washington in February 1991 (Udenrigsministeriet 
(Danish MFA), February 14 1991).
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understanding the reason why, is an important part of the story about the Baltic struggle for 
independence in 1991. 
1. THE BALTIC PROJECT AS A DANISH ACTIVIST PROJECT 
Understanding small state support for the Baltic cause could therefore mean analysing 
either Icelandic or Danish Baltic policies. This article focuses on the Danish case, because a 
consensus on the Baltic policy between the main political factions was initially, as we shall see, 
rather weak in Denmark2. This means that at least one significant competing foreign policy 
line existed, ensuring for analysis a voice critical to the official Danish Baltic policy. 
The Danish Baltic policy is also crucial to understanding Danish foreign policy at the end 
of the Cold War in general. Thus, in Denmark, the Baltic project became one of the very first 
examples of a new kind of Danish foreign policy “activism” that followed after the end of 
the Cold War (Olesen, 2012). Activism in a Danish foreign policy context roughly means that 
Denmark actively prioritized its limited resources to initiatives believed to further a specific 
Danish agenda – usually the spreading or strengthening of perceived Danish and Western 
values abroad3. The activist project has generally enjoyed a very broad backing across parties 
in Denmark (Petersen, 2004, pp. 446-447) to an extent that seemingly stands in contrast to 
the last Cold War years of bitter foreign policy strife in Danish politics (the so-called “footnote 
years” spent debating NATO’s nuclear strategy). However, as will be shown, this consensus 
was not initially present with regards to the Danish Baltic project4. Rather, the centre-right 
government, made up predominately by the Conservative Party and the Liberal Party5, 
pursued support for Baltic independence much more aggressively than the predominately 
Social Democratic centre-left opposition would have liked. When and how did the consensus 
about Danish “activism” then indeed come about? And why could the centre-right and centre-
left not initially agree on the Danish Baltic policy? 
The approach to the Danish international deliberations in this article goes against the 
traditional approach to the topic in the literature. Thus, Danish support for the independence 
of the Baltic countries from 1989 has often been regarded as a prime example of consensus 
about the new Danish activism in those crucial years when the Cold War was coming to an 
end (Mouritzen, 1992, p. 18, Petersen, 2004, p. 483) or internal Danish discussions have 
simply been ignored (Heurlin, 1998). However, based on declassified material on the “behind 
2 In Iceland a centre-left government seemingly competed with its centre-right opposition to be the most 
pro-Baltic. This was at least the view expressed by the Icelandic ambassador to Denmark in February 1991 
(Udenrigsministeriet (Danish MFA), February 14 1991). This might be because Iceland, a NATO member that 
benefitted from a geographical position in the middle of the Atlantic (Readman, 2006: p. 18), was less vulnerable 
vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.  
3 While the ideas upon which activism was based were certainly around much earlier (Branner, 2000), the 
fact remains that it only took centre stage at the end of the Cold War.
4 (Hansen, 1996: pp. 53-55) briefly addresses the Social Democratic caution, but ultimately underplay its im-
portance. This article argues that it was a symptom of a more general disagreement and therefore much more 
important.
5 The Social Liberals joined the government from 1988-1990, but were not influential in foreign policy issues. 
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closed doors” deliberations of Danish politicians, this article will, as indicated above, instead 
argue that the consensus about the Danish Baltic policy was less than perfect, and set out to 
investigate how we can explain why that was the case. 
The main hypothesis of this article is that the initially sparse Danish consensus about 
Danish activism and Baltic policies can be explained by analysing the divide that separated 
the way the centre-right government and the Social Democratic opposition reasoned about 
foreign policy along hawk-dove lines. In so doing the article will argue that disagreements 
between the two camps can be attributed to the relative importance each camp attributed 
to détente and the Soviet Union. Answering these questions is important from a Danish 
perspective to understanding the roots of Danish foreign policy activism. It is important from 
a Baltic perspective to understanding what really motivated a key Western country to support 
the Baltic cause during the crucial years leading to independence. And it is important for a 
broader audience interested in how differences in foreign policy preferences along a hawk-
dove divide influence how different parties and politicians perceive foreign policy challenges. 
2. HAWKS AND DOVES IN THE DANISH COLD WAR FOREIGN POLICY
Hawks and doves are oft-used metaphors in international relations used to describe two ideal 
foreign policy positions on the question of accommodation vs. confrontation with adversaries6. 
The differences between hawks and doves can range from outright warmongering to full-scale 
pacifism (Schultz, 2005, pp. 7-8). The categories are quite broad. On the one hand being a hawk 
or a dove means having different end goals. A pacifist might value peace, and a warmonger 
might value enemy suffering above any loss in terms of national interests. However, in the real 
world, these ideal types are rare and most politicians will tend to occupy the wide middle range 
between the two. Both being hawkish or dovish is a matter of degree. Therefore, the difference 
in goals is likely to be in terms of having different conceptions regarding the acceptable cost 
of conflict and war. Being a hawk or a dove also often entails, however, entertaining different 
ideas about cause and effect in international relations.  That is, scripts and schemata about 
what consequences to expect from taking, for example, a tough line vis-à-vis an opponent in a 
negotiation. Is such a foreign policy line usually likely to produce desired concessions? Or is it 
instead more likely to provoke more stubborn resistance? As such, especially moderate hawks 
and doves can often share objectives such as reaching a peaceful settlement of a conflict, but 
differ in what they believe to be the most efficient way to achieve those objectives (Onderco 
and Wagner, 2012, p. 178).   
In Denmark, few inside the main parties can be characterized as anything other than 
moderate hawks or doves. As such, the doves, generally the Social Democrats and the Social 
Liberals, placed more emphasis on détente than the hawks, primarily the Liberals and the 
Conservatives, who gave more priority to deterrence and a stern foreign policy towards the 
6  The metaphor is particularly used to characterize different positions in the American foreign policy debate 
(see for example (Schultz, 2005), (Burgos, 2008) and (Onderco & Wagner, 2012)). The term, though originating 
in the US, it need not be limited to American foreign policy. 
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adversary. But it was a question of degree.  After the Social Liberals, who had initially opposed 
Danish membership in 1949, had accepted it as a fait accompli in 1957, there was no real 
mainstream opposition to Denmark’s NATO membership as such. This also meant that the 
Danish NATO strategy throughout the Cold War was predominately that of a loyal ally – though 
there were exceptions (Villaume, 1995). Thus, on the really big issues, such as the presence 
of American bases as well as nuclear weapons in Greenland or the acceptance of Germany 
into NATO, Denmark had acquiesced to allied requests (DUPI, 1997, Mouritzen and Olesen, 
2010). But on other issues, most notably on Danish adherence to détente and on UN norm 
promotion as well as on the Danish attempt to link defence and aid money together when 
evaluating the Danish contribution to NATO, Denmark attempted to retain a separate initiative 
in its policies. In such cases the Danish moderate hawks would generally be less inclined to 
challenge the official NATO line than the doves – arguably because the preferred foreign policy 
line of the hawks themselves most often lay closer to the NATO line than was the case with 
the doves. Until the late 1970s the differences between hawks and doves were overshadowed 
by a general agreement between Social Democrats, Liberals, and Conservatives about the 
NATO policy, but especially in the 1980s this agreement was greatly weakened. And because 
the Social Liberals at the time largely agreed with the centre-right government on economic 
issues, but remained a dove on foreign policy, the result was the so-called Footnote Policy 
years: A decade during which a dovish majority in Parliament, spearheaded by the Social 
Democrats and Social Liberals, forced the hawkish centre-right government, under Prime 
Minister Schlüter and Minister for Foreign Affairs Uffe Ellemann-Jensen, to pursue a dovish 
strategy on nuclear weapons in spite of thereby going against the official NATO line.
This was the state of affairs until the election of 1988, which came to be called the “nuclear 
election.” It punished the parties who had supported the so-called “Footnote Policy” and was 
the first step on the road towards its eventual breakdown. Its abolition greatly weakened the 
Danish détente-faction. It also removed from Danish politics a topic, which had for a decade 
been a core point of contention in the foreign and security policy debates. Finally, the break 
with the footnotes came simultaneously with the growing awareness that the thawing of 
the Cold War opened room for new initiatives in Danish foreign policy. The pressing question 
became what those initiatives should be. 
In Denmark, times of change have often led to the establishment of commissions on 
foreign policy or defence, in order to evaluate if change is required on these issues. And, in 
1989, a Danish Foreign Policy Commission was established with exactly this goal in mind. In 
content, their report was quite technical, as it dealt with much administrative restructuring 
within the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. However, even if the Commission itself did not deliver 
any truly comprehensive analysis of Danish foreign policy, the few comments that it did make 
on this matter, signalled that the Danish foreign policy elite was preparing for change. Thus, 
the Commission report clearly stated that:
“There has in the Commission been agreement on the point that when stiffened fronts 
dissolve, it becomes more difficult to orientate while at the same time the need for this and 
the possibilities to gain influence through new structures are increased. There is therefore 
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a need for an active diplomacy for practicing an active internationalism [in this article ter-
med “activist foreign policy”]. Compared to the international conditions the Foreign Policy 
Commission of 1957 worked under, the situation today is marked by completely different 
circumstances that require new thinking” (Udenrigskommissionen, 1990, pp. 14-15, author’s 
translation from Danish). 
There was no doubt among commission members that Danish foreign policy had to change 
drastically to adapt to the possibilities and challenges of a new world. This marks a crucial 
development towards Danish foreign policy activism, not least since the report had a very 
broad base, not only among the Danish political parties but also in Danish civil life. But what 
kind of activism? Ellemann-Jensen’s opening statement that inaugurated the Commission’s 
work indicated what was in store with the new policy. He stated that while Danish foreign 
policy practitioners should still prioritize Danish national interests: 
“... we harbor - as a society carried by the respect for the individual, for democracy, and 
for international legal security - just as strong a wish for other countries to have improved 
possibility to enjoy the same goods as us” (Udenrigskommissionen, 1990, p. 39, author’s 
translation from Danish).
This statement stressed the strong ideological element in activist internationalism – or 
activist foreign policy, as it is called in this article. As mentioned above, this was not new; 
Ellemann-Jensen cited Denmark’s on-going aid policy as a good example of this foreign 
policy line. However, what was new was that activism was given (at least rhetorically) equal 
weight with classic Danish national interests, such as the safeguarding of Danish political 
and economic independence, and that it was to focus on a small number of targets in order 
to maximize Danish influence. As Ellemann-Jensen stated: “Prioritizing will therefore be a 
keyword” (Udenrigskommissionen, 1990, p. 40, author’s translation from Danish). Priority was 
exactly what the Danish government was about to give to its support for the Baltic countries’ 
struggle for independence.
3. THE CASE: DANISH DISAGREEMENTS ABOUT THE BALTIC INDEPENDENCE PROJECT  
One can speak of two phases of disagreement: When Baltic independence movements began 
to stir in 1988, it was initially the Social Democrats who were in the forefront arguing for Danish 
involvement, while the centre-right government insisted on restraint and on the continuation 
of the policy of strict non-recognition and isolation of local Baltic authorities.  However, after 
just a few years, the positions were reversed. From 1990, the Danish centre-right government 
aggressively pursued contacts with the Balts, while it was the Social Democrats that pleaded 
for caution and restraint, though primarily behind closed doors. 
In order to explain this shift, a short judicial back-story to Denmark’s relationship with the 
Baltic countries and their occupation by the Soviet Union in 1940 is needed. Thus, the truth 
was that, in the beginning of 1988, Denmark had little in terms of a specific Baltic strategy. 
Denmark had been occupied by Nazi-Germany when the Baltic countries were annexed by 
the Soviet Union and as such had not had to actively deal with that annexation. Furthermore, 
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after Denmark joined NATO in 1949, its Baltic policy came to mirror the US policy, which was 
a policy of non-recognition of the Soviet annexation of the Baltic countries of 1940. Contact 
with local Baltic authorities was therefore forbidden, because it was feared that such contacts 
could be interpreted by the Soviet Union as an indirect de jure acceptance of the annexation 
(Petersen, 2004, p. 483). 
Events were proceeding at a brisk pace in 1988: The reforms of Mikhail Gorbachev were 
loosening the Soviet grip around the Baltic countries. Simultaneously, events in the Baltic 
countries themselves were moving quickly with widespread popular outcries in particular 
directed against the historical annexation, linked as it was to the infamous Molotov-Rippentrop 
Pact, in which Josef Stalin and Adolf Hitler divided Eastern Europe between themselves. Though 
this criticism had not yet developed into a full-fledged popular demand for independence, it 
was clear, also to local Baltic authorities, that popular attitude towards Russia was steadily 
worsening. Finally, neighbouring Sweden was drastically boosting its involvement in the Baltic 
area through the establishment of consulate links to the Baltic countries (Udenrigsministeriet 
(Danish MFA), April 7 1989). This was initially easier for Sweden due to the fact that Sweden, 
while WWII was still raging, had accepted the Soviet annexation of the Baltic States and could 
therefore negotiate directly with the local Baltic authorities. 
This was the state of affairs, which Danish politicians had to deal with in in 1988 and 1989. 
In the following, the argument will be made that the Danish internal disagreements can be 
explained on the basis of old hawk-dove differences between Liberals and Social Democrats 
that simply carried over from their Cold War strategies to their forming activist policies.     
3 . 1  B e f o r e  J a n u a r y  1 9 9 0 :  S o c i a l  D e m o c ra t s  p r e s s  i n  va i n  f o r  m o r e  a c t i v e 
e n g a g e m e n t 
The most substantial discussion about establishing the Danish Baltic Project occurred between 
Liberal Minister for Foreign Affairs Ellemann-Jensen and the leading Social Democrats from 
1989 and onwards. Initially, much of the disagreement among the parties was technical, and 
related to how the policy of non-recognition could be pursued in practice. Ellemann-Jensen 
adhered closely to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs’ recommended line described above, while 
former Prime Minister and former Social Democratic party leader Anker Jørgensen and current 
Social Democratic party leader Svend Auken were impatient. But there were also signs of 
more fundamental differences between the two parties. In the minutes from a Danish debate 
connected to a Nordic Foreign and Development Ministers’ meeting in August 1989 over the 
Nordic Baltic policies, Auken is referenced to have said:
“…concerning the Baltic States he did not find that Denmark was particularly active. 
He wondered if the reason for this was the policy of non-recognition, which seemed to 
represent a restraint for Denmark and Norway. If one looked at Sweden and Finland, they 
were capable of doing quite different things…. He had to ask if the time had not come to 
reconsider the doctrine about non-recognition, in such a way that one could expand the 
scope of contact with the Baltic countries….” (Udenrigsministeriet (Danish MFA), August 
1989, author’s translation from Danish).
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Furthermore, Auken is referenced to have said “…he wanted to make clear that they [the 
Social Democrats] did not want to support separatist movements….” (Udenrigsministeriet 
(Danish MFA), August 1989, author’s translation from Danish).
This statement indicates two things about Social Democratic thinking about grand strategy 
in 1989. First, it supports the assertion above that the Social Democrats did not have a problem 
giving up the strict interpretation of a policy of non-recognition. Second, the conclusion at the 
end - that they did not want to support separatist movements - indicates that the reason that 
non-recognition did not matter as much to the Social Democrats now was that the Cold War 
was thawing. They saw this as being primarily due Gorbachev’s reforms, and as confirming 
evidence for their détente-leaning understanding of how to approach the Cold War. With 
Gorbachev as a negotiating partner rather than an adversary, Social Democrat’s concerns 
about possible Soviet attempts to frame a Danish relaxation of the policy of non-recognition 
as an acceptance of their 1940 annexation of the Baltic countries were also less than the 
Liberals’. Thus, the Social Democrats sought a solution to the Baltic problem in 1989 through 
increased contacts and cooperation with Gorbachev, thereby seeking to combine a cautious 
activism in the Baltics with their détente based Cold War strategy.
Ellemann-Jensen initially largely rejected the Social Democratic concerns on the grounds 
that the Baltic countries themselves allegedly did not want the non-recognition policy 
abandoned,7 although he shared their interest in getting involved in the Baltic countries. 
However, a key concern for him was also that the policy of non-recognition was just then 
being debated among the Western European countries and in NATO. Thus, “It was therefore 
the position of the Minister for Foreign Affairs that one should not rock the boat by changing 
formalities.”8 As long as the NATO line was firmly set against giving up on non-recognition, 
the Minister for Foreign Affairs was against it.  The Baltic countries were occupied countries, 
and any leaders there were assumed to be henchmen of the occupying power. Therefore, the 
West had to demonstrate its opposition to the occupation by refusing to have contacts with 
Baltic representatives.
7  In fact, the Baltic leaders sometimes paid relatively little attention to the policy of non-recognition in their 
eagerness to secure contacts with the West, (see for example, Udenrigsministeriet (Danish MFA), March 10 1989). 
What Ellemann-Jensen might have meant here may have been along the lines that the Baltic states ought not to 
wish for Denmark to give up its policy of non-recognition. In fact, the Danish policy towards the Baltic countries 
could be paternalistic at times. In October, 1990, a senior Danish official, wrote in a hand-written comment on a 
memo that suggested the Balts were taking a step back for tactical reasons, “Yes, if we can presuppose rationality 
with the Balts” (Udenrigsministeriet (Danish MFA), October 31 1990, author’s translation from Danish,).
8  Minutes from a debate at the Nordic Foreign and Development Ministers’ meeting in August 1989 (Uden-
rigsministeriet (Danish MFA), August 1989, author’s translation from Danish,).  It is curious that Minister for 
Foreign Affairs Ellemann-Jensen would choose the expression “rocking the boat”, as it was exactly the phrase 
that would come to symbolize the policy opposite to his own on the Soviet Union and the Baltic question: one 
must not “rock the boat” and make life more difficult for Gorbachev, because Gorbachev was “our man” in 
the Soviet Union. In fact the term was used by Ellemann-Jensen as late as March 13, 1990 (Svensson, Terkel: 
“Anerkendelsen står fast” in Berlingske Tidende). 
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3 . 2  R o l e s  a r e  r e v e r s e d :  Ag g r e s s i v e  g o v e r n m e n t  s u p p o r t  f o r  t h e  B a l t s  i n  1 9 9 0
In late 1989 changes were underway regarding the NATO policy towards the Baltic countries. 
Most strikingly, the US, previously the key proponent for non-recognition, gradually began 
to change its view. This did not go unnoticed in Copenhagen. Puzzled Danish ministerial 
inquiries into the matter were later met with the response, “You can do a lot of things if only 
you have good lawyers” (Udenrigsministeriet (Danish MFA) March 5 1991). This change on 
the American side was influenced by and coincided with the fact that stronger and stronger 
evidence suggested that the Baltic governments could no longer be seen as Moscow puppets. 
Nevertheless, not all NATO countries decisively changed their Baltic policies as a consequence 
as anything that could now be said to support Baltic pleas for independence came to be seen 
as creating difficulties for Gorbachev. “Don’t rock the boat” and thereby risk the new détente 
was a common viewpoint in many Western European capitals9. 
In Denmark the government used the changed conditions to make a drastic shift in its 
foreign policy. Thus, on January 17, 1990, the Minister for Foreign Affairs sanctioned a crucial 
memo officially giving up Denmark’s policy of non-recognition and opening the option of 
contact with the Baltic local governments – many of which were newly elected in early 1990 
(Udenrigsministeriet (Danish MFA), January 17 1990). Because of these changes, establishing 
contacts with the Balts shifted to being a quite hawkish initiative directly challenging Soviet 
authority. For the same reason, the Social Democrats also changed their position since 
widespread contact with the Balts could no longer be combined with a détente-based foreign 
policy. This led to a series of internal disagreements between Liberal Ellemann-Jensen and 
the leading Social Democrats throughout the period, which were very different from the 
disagreements prior to the abandoning of the strict policy of non-recognition on January 17, 
1990. It is to these new disagreements that we will now turn. 
Some of the differences came out in the open in the April 1990 debates on the Baltic 
policy in the Danish Parliament. On the surface, there was an almost historic consensus among 
the Danish parties about the Baltic policy, since none of them, from the left-wing Socialist’s 
People’s Party to the nationalist right-wing Progress Party, opposed it. This also mirrored 
the attitude in the population, where two thirds, almost independent of political affiliation, 
condemned the Soviet repression of Lithuania (Gallup, 1991). Besides the obvious incentives 
not to be on the “wrong” side of public opinion, the general agreement among the political 
parties seemed to be anchored in a general feeling of small state sympathy (See for instance 
the debate in Parliament on April 18 1990, Folketinget, April 18 1990). 
This consensus was not perfect, however. If one zooms in on the motivations of each side 
of Parliament, one realizes that although they might have shared a certain amount of small 
state sympathies, all parties in Parliament did not see the situation in exactly the same light. 
The Danish government and the politically extreme right in Parliament focused on the 
historical wrongs inflicted upon the Baltic countries by the Soviet Union and expected good 
9  Uffe Ellemann-Jensen refers to the use of this term in the international debates in his autobiography (Elle-
mann-Jensen, 1996: p. 133)
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Soviet behaviour as proof that it was no longer the brutal great power it had been in 1940. 
In addition, the right in Parliament focused on Denmark’s historical experience with great 
powers. Minister for Foreign Affairs Ellemann-Jensen stressed in Parliament on April 18, 1990, 
that:
“In the attempt to restore contacts [with the Balts], we owe it to the Balts and to ourselves 
to proceed responsibly. The situation in the Baltic countries and especially in Lithuania is 
tense. The process which the Baltic countries have initiated in different ways is both difficult 
and dangerous. It is our duty to plan our policy in such a manner that it benefits and at least 
does not hurt the chances for the process to succeed, and that requires that we act with aftert-
hought and responsibility,” (Folketinget, April 18 1990, author’s translation from Danish).
Conservative Per Stig Møller stressed the Baltic movements as a natural consequence of 
Gorbachev’s glasnost and perestroika policies and “Therefore, the Baltic conflict questions 
Gorbachev’s credibility. If he wants democracy, he must respect the decisions of democracy” 
(Folketinget, April 18 1990, author’s translation from Danish). This also corresponds well with 
the aforementioned statement of Ellemann-Jensen regarding the need to push the Soviets 
in the right direction and points to general agreement between the two largest government 
parties around a quite hawkish foreign policy line: If one wanted results from enemies, they 
must be pushed. 
On the political left of the Danish Parliament, most among notably the Social Democrats, 
the Socialist’s People’s Party and the Social Liberals, their small state sympathy was connected 
to their vision for a more orderly international system, where great powers could not simply 
impose their will on small states.  Social Democratic Party leader Auken remarked in the 
Foreign Policy Committee, on what were likely his own views, which he projected on the Danish 
voters, that he thought the reason the Baltic countries commanded such great sympathy with 
the Danes was that Denmark is:
“…a small country that was put under pressure by great powers. The same had been 
the case in Afghanistan and Vietnam and, to a degree, in Nicaragua. It was all about spe-
cial resistance towards the great powers saying that they had special rights in their own 
backyards” (Udenrigspolitiske Nævn (Danish Foreign Policy Committee), April 4, 1990, 
author’s translation from Danish). 
Thus, even the relatively dovish Social Democrats expressed an interest in making demands 
of the Soviet Union. The choice of historical examples, however, somewhat softens the 
statement. Afghanistan was another example of Soviet tyranny, but in Vietnam and Nicaragua 
it was American interventions he criticized. As such, one senses an attempt to criticize the 
Soviet Union without simultaneously joining the NATO hardliners. Furthermore, the Social 
Democrats were also quite sceptical towards Lithuanian conduct regarding independence in 
particular, which they found too hasty and risky. This reflects that the Social Democrats, in 
all likelihood, still had continued détente as their primary goal, and that they feared that too 
forceful a Danish posture might provoke the Soviet Union and weaken détente efforts there. 
The scepticism regarding the Balts is also reflected in the summaries of Auken’s remarks at 
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the Social Democratic parliamentary group meeting on March 13, 1990, where he cautioned, 
“We must be careful not to be sucked into the diplomatic game. There is no need for Danish 
adventurism” (Socialdemokraterne, March 13, 1990, author’s translation from Danish). He 
continued along these lines at another group meeting two weeks later: 
“My best advice is that we shall be patient. Even if it might seem a peculiar example, I 
want to point out that Greenland’s self-rule took 4-5 years [to establish] after full agreement 
about establishing it had been reached. We must keep in mind that if things go wrong in 
Lithuania, everything is threatened. Not just perestroika, but also the German reunification 
and the presently favourable disarmament efforts” (Socialdemokraterne, March 27, 1990, 
author’s translation from Danish).    
Erik B. Smith, a Social Democratic member of Parliament, put it even more bluntly on April 
18, 1990, when the Lithuanian crisis had been a centre of attention for over a month, “To 
the question about the development in the Baltic countries, I would like to caution restraint. 
Lithuania is gambling with Europe’s security” (Socialdemokraterne, April 18 1990, author’s 
translation from Danish). Social Democratic ambivalence towards the Lithuanians was 
probably rooted in one of the most fundamental aspects of the Danish centre-left’s dovish 
Cold War strategy: That détente was the most effective means to soften and break down Cold 
War enmity and mistrust. 
The smaller left-wing parties seemed to share Social Democratic sentiment, although the 
Social Liberals do not seem to have made any big impact on the government’s line. Social Liberal 
spokesman Jørgen Estrup stressed in Parliament, “The foundation for this debate must be the 
realization that it is an incredibly difficult situation, not just for the Baltic countries, but also 
for the reform-friendly faction in the Kremlin” (Folketinget, April 18 1990, author’s translation 
from Danish). So, too, was the general position of Socialist People’s Party spokesman Gert 
Petersen, who remarked in the same debate in Parliament: 
“I agree with the Minister for Foreign Affairs that Denmark, when we – and we must do 
this unconditionally – support the demands for independence [coming] from Lithuania, 
we must do it with reason and responsibility, for, of course, it must be done in such a way 
that one does not sink the entire ship” (Folketinget, April 18 1990, author’s translation 
from Danish). 
Petersen then went on to talk about the promising development in reform movements 
within the cities of the Soviet Union. This last point, however, again shows the difference 
between the government line and representatives of the political left in Parliament. While 
the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the centre-right government stressed that one must not 
do anything that could hurt Denmark or the Balts, the centre-left and the left were more 
concerned about hurting reform movements within the Soviet Union. 
There were limits for the Liberals as well, however. In the summer of 1990, Minister for 
Foreign Affairs Ellemann-Jensen, as host of the CSCE conference in Copenhagen on human 
rights and minority rights, rejected the Baltic application for observer status, though he still 
invited them as guests of Denmark. According to Ellemann-Jensen, doing otherwise could 
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have caused the entire conference to become a failure due to Soviet backlash (Ellemann-
Jensen, 1996, pp. 137-38). A decision that might seem to mirror the “don’t rock the boat” 
policy that guided many other European countries. However, the incident is also consistent 
with an overall Danish strategy based on being in the forefront regarding support of the Balts, 
but not so far ahead as to risk being marginalized – for example by becoming responsible for 
the entire conference’s possible failure (see also footnote 1 for a discussion of the Danish 
strategy). This seems especially likely if one considers the fact that Denmark together with 
Iceland proceeded to work hard for Baltic participation in the follow-up in Paris in November 
1990, as well as the fact that they hosted a press conference for the Balts, when it became 
clear that efforts to include the Balts had failed. (Udenrigsministeriet (Danish MFA), November 
22 1990). 
3 . 3  E n d  g a m e :  D i s a g r e e m e n t s  d u r i n g  t h e  f i n a l  m o n t h s  o f  t h e  B a l t i c  s t r u g g l e 
f o r  i n d e p e n d e n c e  i n  1 9 9 1 
By 1991, the Danish Baltic Project enjoyed considerable public support. In principle the same 
was true in Parliament where no major party ever directly challenged the core of the policy. 
However, there were certainly still subtle nuances in approach that persisted in 1991. This 
became evident not least in the way the different parties reacted to three key events: the 
news of the Lithuanian TV tower massacre in early 1991, the August coup, and eventual Baltic 
independence when the August coup failed. 
In a Foreign Policy Committee meeting on January 15, 1991, Ellemann-Jensen briefed 
members about the preceding negotiations in the “council of the twelve” where Denmark, 
as mentioned earlier, had pushed hard for a stern Western European demarche of the Soviet 
massacre in Vilnius. Ellemann-Jensen characterized the negotiations and the demarche in the 
following manner:   
“Some countries had found that if one reacted too harshly [towards the Soviets] one 
risked weakening Gorbachev in the power struggle that apparently was going on in the 
Soviet Union at the present. There had, however, been broad support for the Danish view 
that it would, in any circumstance, be right to send a strong signal. This would, in the 
Danish view, not just be morally necessary, but also strengthen the Soviet reform-minded 
factions…. [The declaration] was unusually strong for this forum, not least considering the 
very different views that existed. Thus, France had thought that now that one had protested 
nothing more should be done. Others said that one should give Gorbachev the benefit of the 
doubt. To this, the Minister for Foreign Affairs had remarked that if this was the case, and 
Gorbachev had been forced into the situation, then all the more reason to react strongly…” 
(Udenrigspolitiske Nævn (Danish Foreign Policy Committee), January 15 1991, author’s 
translation from Danish).      
This statement demonstrates Ellemann-Jensen’s need to present the Western European 
demarche as a victory for the Danish hard line activist approach to the Soviet Union. At the 
same time, it demonstrates his hawkish approach by focusing on pushing Gorbachev in the 
right direction by threatening strong EC reactions, rather than by merely trying to support him 
by not creating problems for him. 
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The Social Democrats were again the primary representatives of disagreement with the 
government line. Thus, a more dovish détente tendency was clearly visible in statements by 
Social Democratic Party Chairman Auken in the Foreign Policy Committee. After stressing that 
he agreed with the government line, Auken stated that: 
“In Parliament, it was the majority view that, of course, one should seek to secure the 
full independence of the Balts. But one should at the same time refrain from contributing 
to instability. Not least for this reason the Social Democrats and others had supported the 
negotiation strategy. Of course, one should protest, but when peaceful negotiations were 
within reach, one had to seek the stability line at the same time. Therefore Auken thought 
that the statement from the EC-ministers was balanced and good and not quite as strong as 
the Minister for Foreign Affairs indicated [author’s italics]” (Udenrigspolitiske Nævn (Danish 
Foreign Policy Committee), January 15, 1991, author’s translation from Danish). 
The statement indicates that Auken preferred the EC-compromise to the more one-sided 
condemnation that Ellemann-Jensen had perhaps wished for it to be. From an international 
perspective, the difference between the centre-right and Social Democrats shows that the 
Social Democrats were much closer than the centre-right to the so-called “don’t rock the 
boat” foreign policy line that stressed the importance of supporting Gorbachev, which was 
long the predominant position of the other Western European countries.  
The Social Democratic argument was difficult to make to a public that was becoming 
increasingly pro-Baltic. At a demonstration against the Soviet crackdown in Lithuania in the 
Rådhuspladsen, the main square in Copenhagen, on January 14, 1991, Social Democrat Ritt 
Bjerregaard expressed views similar to Ellemann-Jensen’s: 
“Today is one of those days where words feel too weak. It is one of those days where the 
night before the dawn feels so terribly long. It is dark and cold nights that we have experienced 
before - in 1956, when men and tanks raped Hungary. I remember exactly this feeling of 
powerlessness by being confronted with an unreasonable, un-understanding and inhuman 
overwhelming power. And the evil night returned in 1968. The same army sent its tanks 
towards Prague. And in the same fashion, we had to see the just and the humane crushed 
by stupidity. In the holy name of communism. Today we would like to do something more 
than simply talk. We yearn to be able to turn back the clock this one day back. We yearn to 
avoid those tanks and give life to those killed. For their sake, for their country’s sake, and 
for our own hope’s sake” (Udenrigsministeriet (Danish MFA), January 14 1991, author’s 
translation from Danish).
She then said that she believed this to be “…the last despicable cramps of communism. 
Vile and brutal” (Udenrigsministeriet (Danish MFA), January 14 1991, author’s translation from 
Danish). Clearly, Bjerregaard expressed strong antipathy for the Soviet conduct in Lithuania. 
However, what is just as interesting here is what she did not say, and the fact that she focused 
on what she believed was bound to happen in Lithuania on its own, as opposed to addressing 
what Denmark might do. This might very well have been intentional, in order to avoid her 
being bound to pursue as active a policy as one might otherwise expect from her level of 
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indignation. Thus, the next day, behind the closed doors in the Foreign Policy Committee, 
Bjerregaard is referenced in the meeting’s minutes:  
 “The meeting at Rådhuspladsen had been a good indicator of the anger and worry that 
was present [in the Danish population]. There was no way around [author’s italics] a strong 
signal, like the one she [Bjerregaard] and the prime minister had also given at the meeting. 
However, sometimes politics was strong signals that went straight to the people in the midst 
of their homes. And at other times one carefully and soberly had to analyse how to act and 
how to play one’s cards best” (Udenrigspolitiske Nævn (Danish Foreign Policy Committee), 
January 15, 1991, author’s translation from Danish).
Her indignation must, thus, be considered to have at least a rhetorical element. The 
minutes continue: 
“Her only worry was the Minister for Foreign Affairs’ statement about the humanitarian 
work in the Soviet Union. If the West pursued a very restrictive line vis-à-vis the Soviet 
Union that caused the people to starve, it was certain that it would lead to refugee flows that 
would be difficult to handle” (Udenrigspolitiske Nævn (Danish Foreign Policy Committee), 
January 15 1991, author’s translation from Danish).
These statements can be seen as an indicator of the Social Democrats’ support of 
humanitarianism as well as wishes to avoid refugee flows over value-promoting. However, 
when coupled with the fact that Ritt Bjerregaard, later that month, also supported the 
decision of the Danish Social Democrats in the European Parliament to vote against adopting 
harsh measures towards the Soviet Union (Berlingske Tidende, January 29 1991), one sense 
once more that the Social Democrats believed that a dovish, somewhat conciliatory approach 
to Gorbachev was still the best course of action.  
This difference was also apparent when Auken and Ellemann-Jensen discussed the 
consequences of the Soviet coup in a Foreign Policy Committee meeting on August 19, 
1991. There, Auken regretted that the West had not done enough to help Gorbachev, while 
Ellemann-Jensen disagreed (Udenrigspolitiske Nævn (Danish Foreign Policy Committee), 
August 19 1991). This meeting proved to be the last before Danish re-establishment of 
diplomatic relations with the Baltic countries. At the next Foreign Policy Committee meeting 
on August 27, 1991, three days after Denmark had re-established diplomatic contacts with the 
Baltic countries, the Social Democrats expressed some irritation about not being included in 
the final decision about re-establishing diplomatic relations, even though they fully supported 
the decision on its merits (Udenrigspolitiske Nævn (Danish Foreign Policy Committee), August 
27 1991). This was not surprising, as a shift in the balance of power in the Soviet Union in 
favour of Yeltsin, who supported independence, tended to make arguments anchored in 
support for Gorbachev obsolete. Thus, there was simply no longer a dilemma. With the power 
of the Soviet Union broken, and with Russia in support of Baltic independence, the risks to 
détente connected with that support largely disappeared. Therefore, the Social Democrats 
now wholeheartedly committed to the Baltic Project. 
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Once established, the consensus on the Baltic project proved stable. During the Social 
Democratic Social Liberal government from 1993 to 2001, and during the new centre-right 
government of 2001, Denmark pushed for both EU and NATO membership for all three Baltic 
countries with a very broad backing in the Danish parliament. 
4. THE ALTERNATIVE “BEING IN GOVERNMENT” HYPOTHESIS:  
PERHAPS IT IS JUST “THE CHAIR” THAT MAKES THE DIFFERENCE?
The hypothesis here has been that the relative hawkishness and dovishness of the centre-
right government and the Social Democratic opposition can explain their different foreign 
policy preferences in the Baltic question. However, alternative variables might be able to 
explain this as well. In this regard, one might ask the methodological question of whether the 
different positions of the parties, the Social Democrats being in opposition and the Liberals 
and Conservatives being in government, might itself influence their policy preferences. Thus, 
one might argue that leaders feel the heavy burden of responsibility to national interests 
more keenly than opposition politicians, who might be freer to pursue other agendas? Leaders 
often accuse oppositions of sabotaging their foreign policies for domestic political reasons10. 
Following this logic, it is quite conceivable that being in government makes a party more likely 
to be affected by outside pressure (from allies or enemies). 
However, in our present case this factor is likely to be limited. Thus, the Danish 
disagreements about the Baltic policies can be divided into two phases: In the first we saw the 
Social Democratic opposition push for an active policy that might well be in conflict with the 
NATO line. And in the second period, we saw a centre-right government pursuing an active 
policy, often threatening to bring Denmark into conflict with European partners and the Soviet 
Union (though not without support from the US), while the Social Democrats expressed grave 
worries about the risks of such a policy. It is, of course, impossible to know for sure how 
the debates would have transpired if the government had been Social Democratic and the 
opposition centre-right, but it seems unlikely that it would simply be the same debate in 
reverse. Thus, while an argument about an opposition eager to put itself on the political map 
might make sense for the first period, it seems much less likely for the second period. In 
contrast, the Social Democratic resistance towards the government policy was pursued rather 
in spite of public opinion and, as we saw, primarily behind closed doors. The divergences in 
Ritt Bjerregaard’s expressed views in public and behind closed doors seem to exemplify this 
tendency. The reverse can be said about the centre-right government, which proved willing 
to withstand political pressure for a more active Baltic policy before 1990 in order to stick to 
the line of non-recognition promoted by the allies. This, furthermore, even though this policy 
proved extremely hard to “sell” to the public – perhaps due to its complex nature.
10  Examples from Danish domestic politics include then Minister for Foreign Affairs Uffe Ellemann-Jensen’s 
accusations that the centre-left were motivated by domestic concerns when they forced him to pursue the 
previously mentioned Danish Footnote Policy (Ellemann-Jensen, 2004). A recent American example is former 
President Bill Clinton blaming the Republicans in Congress for sabotaging the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 
1998 for domestic concerns (Jentleson, 2013, pp. 35-36). 
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CONCLUDING REMARKS
Activism was gaining across a broad political spectrum in Denmark from 1988, and the Baltic 
cause quickly became very popular in Denmark. The centre-right government and the Social 
Democrats never waged serious wars against each other over the Baltic issue that are in any 
way comparable with the battles of the Footnote Policy Years. However, the analysis has 
shown that being a hawk or dove, nevertheless, did matter: It is, thus, highly unlikely that a 
Social Democratic government would have pursued a policy similar to the one pursued by the 
centre-right. 
We have seen that the Social Democrats saw the Baltic question as a dilemma: On the one 
hand, they wanted to support Baltic independence because of small state sympathies and 
because of an interest in strengthening an international order which safeguards the interests 
of the small. On the other hand, however, they remained committed to détente as the way 
out of the Cold War. This dilemma was never solved for them until the failed coup in August 
1991 and the imminent implosion of the Soviet Union thereafter. Because of this dilemma, the 
Social Democrats could not commit wholeheartedly to the Baltic cause as an activist project 
until détente had been made obsolete. 
For the centre-right government, the dilemma was smaller. They shared a small state 
sympathy and a wish to strengthen a world order that safeguarded the rights of small states. 
However, due to their more hawkish approach to the Cold War and to foreign policy in 
general, they were never as committed to détente policies as the Social Democrats. For them, 
influencing Soviet behaviour was as much about pushing the Soviets, when possible, as it 
was about keeping the dialog going. Since activist support for the Balts therefore did not 
contrast with their general strategy for bringing the Cold War to an end, they could commit 
to the activist project much earlier than the Social Democrats. The policies of the moderately 
centre-right government are therefore unlikely to have been pursued had the opposition been 
in power. Their hawk-dove differences likely explain why. 
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